Statute of limitations

April 2020 employment law decisions

Gender discrimination verdict reversed based on trial court’s series of errors.

April 23, 2020, Second District Court of Appeal, Lauren Pinter-Brown v. The Regents of the University of California: Dr. Pinter-Brown sued The Regents for gender discrimination and a jury found in her favor and awarded $13 million in damages. The appellate court reversed because the trial court committed a series of errors that prejudiced The Regents’ right to a fair trial by an impartial judge: (1) the court delivered a presentation to the jury highlighting major figures in the civil rights movement and told the jury it was their duty to stand in the shoes of Dr. Martin Luther King; (2) the court allowed the jury to hear about and view a long list of discrimination complaints from across the entire UC system that were not connected to Dr. Pinter-Brown’s circumstances or theory of the case; (3) the court allowed the jury to learn the contents and conclusion of a report documenting racial discrimination occurring throughout the entire UCLA campus; and (4) the court allowed Dr. Pinter-Brown to resurrect a retaliation claim after the close of evidence despite having dismissed that claim prior to trial.

After-acquired evidence may be used in federal disability discrimination cases for the issue of whether the employee was qualified for their position.

April 17, 2020, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal, Sunny Anthony v. TRAX International Corporation: Ms. Anthony sued TRAX for disability discrimination. During the course of the case, TRAX discovered that Ms. Anthony lacked a required degree for the position she held. The Ninth Circuit concluded that this “after-acquired evidence” could be used by TRAX to show that Ms. Anthony was not qualified for her position, and, therefore, not protected under the federal disability discrimination law.

Staffing agencies uninvolved in promotion decisions cannot be held liable for a failure to promote claim.

April 7, 2020, Second District Court of Appeal, Bonnie Ducksworth v. Tri-Modal Distribution Services et al.: Ms. Ducksworth and another employee, Pamela Pollock, sued Tri-Modal and two staffing agencies that supplied them to Tri-Modal for race discrimination in promotion decisions. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the case against the staffing agencies because they were uninvolved in Tri-Modal’s decisionmaking about whom to promote. Ms. Pollack also had a harassment claim against Tri-Modal’s executive vice president arising from promotion decisions. The Second District also affirmed the dismissal of Ms. Pollack’s case against the executive vice president because it was filed too late (statute of limitations). It determined that the statute of limitations began running when Tri-Modal told employees they have been given a promotion (and not when the promoted worker started the new work).

Federal sector employees may prove age discrimination without showing their age was the but-for cause for an adverse employment action.

April 6, 2020, U.S. Supreme Court, Babb v. Wilkie, Secretary of Veterans Affairs: The high court decided that the age discrimination law for federal-sector employees does not require a showing that age was a but-for cause of an adverse employment action. The law’s language that “all personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment who are at least 40 years of age…shall be made free from any discrimination based on age” creates a more protective standard as compared to the law covering state and private sector employees. At the same time, in order to recover reinstatement, backpay, and compensatory (non-economic) damages, federal employees must satisfy the but-for cause standard.

Payment of accrued vacation time required even when there is no specific time off limit.

April 1, 2020, Second District Court of Appeal, Teresa McPherson v. EF Intercultural Foundation, Inc.: California’s Labor Code requires an employer to pay all unused, vested (accrued or earned) vacation time when an employee separates. The court of appeal decided that under the circumstances of this particular case, this requirement applied to the employer’s paid time off policy in which it did not promise its employees a specific amount of paid vacation that they would accrue or expressly tell them the paid time off was unlimited (and a limit was implied). But the Second District also stated that the requirement to pay vested vacation time does not apply to all unlimited paid time off policies.

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October and November 2019 employment law decisions

Federal employee’s case that named the wrong defendant is still timely.

November 14, 2019, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Alisha Silbaugh v. Elaine Chao: Ms. Silbaugh filed her case concerning her employment with the Federal Aviation Administration within the time limits (statue of limitations) but named the wrong defendant. After the limitations period ran, the FAA moved to dismiss the action on grounds the case had to be filed against the head of the executive agency to which the FAA belongs. Ms. Silbaugh responded by filing an amended complaint that named the Secretary of Transportation (Ms. Chao) as the defendant. The district court denied FAA’s motion to dismiss as moot. Ms. Chao filed a motion to dismiss on grounds the amended complaint was not timely because it did not “relate back” to the original complaint. The district court agreed. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed a federal rule of civil procedure (15(c)) that provides that an amendment relates back to the original complaint when a United States officer or agency is added as a defendant if the original complaint and summons was served on the United States attorney, the Attorney General, or the officer or agency within a 90-day period. Because Ms. Silbaugh timely served the United States attorney and Attorney General her amendment to re-name the defendant related back. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal.

Disability discrimination need not be based on animus or ill will.

November 13, 2019, Second District Court of Appeal, John Glynn v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County: Mr. Glynn sued his employer for disability discrimination. The case arose from a temporary benefits staffer mistakenly thinking Mr. Glynn had transitioned from short term disability to long term disability and was unable to work with or without an accommodation. On that basis, the staffer terminated Mr. Glynn. For months the employer ignored Mr. Glynn’s efforts to correct the misunderstanding. The issue before the court of appeal was whether this constituted direct evidence of disability discrimination. Under the direct evidence method of proof the employee must show that his employer knew of his disability and the disability was a substantial motivating reason for an adverse employment action such as termination. The court of appeal reviewed a prior appellate decision in which the court concluded that animus or ill will was not required to prove discriminatory intent; rather, the disability discrimination law protects employees from erroneous or mistaken beliefs about the employee’s disability. In this case, the termination letter stated that Mr. Glynn’s employment ended due to his inability to return to work with or without an accommodation. As a result, the court of appeal concluded that Mr. Glynn’s case could not be dismissed (summary judgment).

Each payment of an alleged discriminatory disability check triggers a new statute of limitations period.

October 31, 2019, First District Court of Appeal, Joyce Carroll v. City and County of San Francisco: Ms. Carroll sued her former employer as a class representative claiming that San Francisco discriminated based on age by providing reduced disability retirement benefits to older employees who took disability retirement after working for the City for less than 22.22 years. A required administrative charge with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing was filed more than 17 years after Ms. Carroll retired. The trial court dismissed the case (demurrer) on grounds the DFEH charge was filed too late (statute of limitations). The court of appeal decided that the one-year limitations period started each time Ms. Carroll received a discriminatory disability payment. Therefore, the dismissal was reversed.

Employer’s service charge may be considered a tip that must be distributed to employees.

October 31, 2019, First District Court of Appeal, Lauren O’Grady v. Merchant Exchange Productions, Inc.: Ms. Grady sued her employer as a class representative asserting a failure to distribute tips (gratuities). Merchant Exchange Productions added a mandatory “service charge” to the contract for every banquet facility it provided and distributed only some of the charge to managerial employees who did not serve food and beverages at the banquet. Ms. Grady alleged that she and other employees who served food and beverages were entitled to the entire service charge as a tip as required by California’s Labor Code (section 351). The court of appeal decided that a service charge can meet the Labor Code’s definition of a tip and that Ms. O’Grady’s complaint sufficiently alleged a violation of law.

Posted by deanroyerlaw in Employment

July 2019 employment law decisions

On-duty meal periods subject to the 30-minute minimum requirement.

July 31, 2019, First District Court of Appeal, L’Chaim House, Inc. v. Division of Labor Standards Enforcement: Residential care home is required to provide meal periods of at least 30 minutes even when they are “on-duty” periods, i.e., the nature of the work prevents the employees from being relieved of all duty and the employer and employees agree in writing to an on-the-job paid meal period.

Anti-SLAPP motions available in discrimination or retaliation cases but not in this particular case.

July 22, 2019, Supreme Court of California, Stanley Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc.: The anti-SLAPP statute (special motion to strike claims that arise from the defendant’s constitutionally protected activity) may be used to screen claims alleging discriminatory or retaliatory employment actions because the defendant’s adverse action is a necessary element of such claims. Mr. Wilson’s claim that his employer defamed him by privately discussing the alleged reasons for his termination with potential employers and others is not subject to the anti-SLAPP statute because the communications were not made in connection with any issue of public significance.

Employees have sufficient evidence for discrimination and harassment claims.

July 17, 2019, Third District Court of Appeal, Nancy Ortiz v. Dameron Hospital Association and Shirley Galvan v. Dameron Hospital Association: The facts were disputed whether Dameron constructively terminated Ms. Ortiz and Ms. Galvan because there was evidence that their supervisor intentionally created working conditions that would cause a reasonable person to feel compelled to resign. The facts were also disputed whether the supervisor acted with national origin discrimination motive based on evidence that the supervisor focused her criticisms on subordinates’ accents and English language skills. The facts were further disputed whether Ms. Ortiz and Ms. Galvan were subjected to unlawful harassment given the evidence of the supervisor’s criticisms of accents and English-speaking skills and references to subordinates’ ages, including calling them “too old”; and in Ms. Ortiz’s case, the additional evidence of being transferred to a unit where she had little or no experience and provided with no training, being falsely accused of sleeping on the job, and being told she would likely be fired.

Jury verdict in favor of employee in race discrimination and retaliation case affirmed.

July 17, 2019, Third District Court of Appeal, Wendell Brown v. City of Sacramento: Mr. Brown could recover for a suspension that occurred more than one year before he filed a complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) because the suspension did not become final until a union grievance challenging it was dismissed within the one-year statute of limitations period. Mr. Brown could also recover for a transfer that had been announced but not scheduled to take effect until after he filed his DFEH complaint. Although the DFEH complaint did not refer to the specific transfer, it included general language about being forced to transfer and the DFEH investigation would have likely uncovered the specific transfer at issue.

Employer not required to reimburse its employees for purchasing slip-resistance shoes.

July 8, 2019, Third District Court of Appeal, Krista Townley v. BJ’s Restaurants, Inc.: BJ’s Restaurants has a safety policy that requires its employees to wear slip-resistance shoes, although no specific brand, style, or design is required and the policy does not prohibit the employees from wearing their shoes outside of work. The California law requiring employers to reimburse their employees for expenses incurred in the discharge of their work duties (Labor Code section 2802) does not apply because the shoes are non-uniform work clothing and generally usable in the restaurant occupation.

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April and May 2018 employment law decisions

Employees may pursue representative claims as long as they are personally affected by at least one of the alleged violations.

May 23, 2018, Sixth District Court of Appeal, Forrest Huff v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc.: Mr. Huff filed representative claims against his former employer under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) alleging violations concerning the pay practices of Securitas. The trial court concluded that Mr. Huff could pursue all of the claims even if he could not prove that he was personally affected by one of the violations. PAGA claims allow private parties to sue for civil penalties that previously were only recoverable by a state agency (Labor Commissioner). When employees bring representative actions under PAGA, they do as a proxy or agent of the agency, not other employees. On appeal, Securitas contended that Mr. Huff could only pursue PAGA claims for violations that personally affected him. The appellate court reviewed the law, which states that an “aggrieved employee” who may file a PAGA claim is “any person who was employed by the alleged violator and against whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed.” (Labor Code section 2699(c).) The Sixth District concluded that this means a PAGA claim may be brought by a person employed by the alleged violator and affected by at least one of the violations alleged in the case.

Representative claims for pay statement violations do not require proof of injury or a knowing and intentional violation.

May 22, 2018, Third District Court of Appeal, Terri Raines v. Coastal Pacific Food Distributors, Inc.: Ms. Rains sued her former employer alleging, among other claims, a representative claim under PAGA concerning pay statement violations. The trial court dismissed the case (summary judgment) after deciding that Ms. Rains had not suffered an injury as required for an individual claim because the missing hourly overtime rate could be determined from the pay statement by simple math. On appeal, the Third District reviewed the pay statement law, which requires a number of items in pay statements including all applicable hourly rates in effect during the pay period. The parties agreed that Ms. Raines’s statements did not show the overtime hourly rate. The appellate court noted that there are three different remedies for a pay statement violation: actual damages or statutory ($50 per pay period) penalties, injunctive relief, and civil penalties ($250 per pay period for an initial violation under PAGA). The Third District determined that a civil penalty was available not just when no pay statement is provided but also when the pay statement violates the law in some way. Previous decisions by federal courts had come to opposing conclusions as to whether a party with a PAGA claim concerning pay statement violations must prove injury. In addition, the First District Court of Appeal had recently decided, in Lopez v. Friant & Associates, LLC (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 773, that there was no injury or knowing and intentional requirement for a PAGA claim. The Fourth District agreed with the First District.

UC whistleblowers may file suit after adverse administrative decisions.

May 14, 2018, Fourth District Court of Appeal, Carl Taswell v. The Regents of the University of California: Dr. Taswell sued the Regents alleging he was retaliated against for whistleblowing activities regarding patient safety during his employment by UC Irvine. The trial court dismissed the case (summary judgment) after deciding that Dr. Taswell’s claims were barred by a University decision denying his grievance challenging his termination and his failure to overturn that decision (by writ of mandamus) before filing suit. The Fourth District reviewed the general principle that an administrative decision that is of sufficient judicial character is binding and precludes a subsequently filed lawsuit unless it is reversed by writ. It also reviewed two prior California Supreme Court decisions that established the rule that civil servants and California State University employees could file whistleblower retaliation claims in court after receiving adverse administrative decisions concerning the same claims. The appellate court then turned to the section of the whistleblower retaliation law that applies to UC employees (Government Code section 8547.10), which has the same language that applies to CSU employees (authorizing a civil suit if the employer has not satisfactorily addressed the administrative complaint). The Fourth District concluded that the same interpretation applies to UC employees: a court action is permitted if the employer does not address the complaint to the employee’s satisfaction, e.g., finding against him. The court of appeal also reviewed Dr. Taswell’s claims under separate whistleblower laws (Labor Code section 1102.5 and Government Code section 12653). It determined that although Dr. Taswell was required to “exhaust administrative remedies” (by filing the grievance) the language of the laws clearly reflected a legislative intent to permit a court action. As a result, Dr. Taswell could pursue his claims under those laws as well without overturning the adverse grievance decision.

No failure to engage in interactive process claim under federal law.

May 11, 2018, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Danny Snap v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company: Mr. Snapp sued his former employer alleging a failure to accommodate under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act. The jury found in favor of Burlington. Mr. Snapp appealed. One issue was whether the trial court improperly rejected a proposed jury instruction that would have imposed liability on Burlington for failing to engage in the interactive process regardless of the availability of a reasonable accommodation. The Ninth Circuit reviewed its prior decision, Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc. (9th Cir. 2000) 228 F.3d 1105, in which it decided that if an employer receives notice of an employee’s need for an accommodation and fails to engage in the interactive process (employer and employee come to understand the employee’s abilities and limitations, the employer’s needs for various positions, and a possible middle ground for accommodating the employee), the employer is liable if a reasonable accommodation would have been possible. The appellate court explained this means there is no separate claim for failing to engage in the interactive process (unlike under California law); rather, the claim is for discrimination in denying an available and reasonable accommodation. Previous decisions established that at the summary judgment stage the employer has the burden to prove the unavailability of a reasonable accommodation. The Ninth Circuit rejected Mr. Snapp’s contention that the summary judgment standard applied at trial.

No due process claim for probationary employee.

May 10, 2018, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Richard A. Palm v. Los Angeles Department of Water and Power: Mr. Palm filed suit alleging his employer terminated his employment in a probationary position without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The trial court dismissed his case (motion to dismiss) without leave to amend on grounds Mr. Palm could not state a due process claim because he lacked a property interest in his position. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit recited the standard that Mr. Palm had to demonstrate a constitutionally protected property interest in his position to pursue a due process claim. The appellate court reviewed the Los Angeles Charter and Civil Service Rules. During probation Los Angeles could terminate Mr. Palm based on a subjective finding that he had demonstrated unsatisfactory performance. In a previous decision, the Ninth Circuit concluded that an employer’s ability to determine on a purely subjective basis whether a probationary employee had performed satisfactorily undercuts any expectation of continued employment. Also, during probation Mr. Palm had no right of appeal of a termination to a Board of Civil Service Commissioners. The Ninth Circuit decided that probationary positions held by city employees are not vested with a protected property interest.

Failure to accommodate and engage in interactive process where the employer terminated the probationary employee while on leave on grounds the employee’s performance had not been reviewed.

May 3, 2018, Fourth District Court of Appeal, Marisa Hernandez v. Rancho Santiago Community College District: Ms. Hernandez sued the District under California law for failure to make reasonable accommodation for her medical condition and failure to engage in an interactive process. Ms. Hernandez was hired in 2013 with a one-year probationary period and performance reviews due at three, seven, and 11 months; after 12 months she would become a permanent employee. Her performance was not evaluated after three or seven months. Eight months into the probationary period, Ms. Hernandez went on temporary disability leave to have surgery for an injured suffered during a previous employment with the District. She was scheduled to return to work around the 12-month anniversary of her hiring date. The District terminated her while she was on leave because her performance had not been reviewed. The case went to trial where the court found in Ms. Hernandez’s favor and awarded her $723,746 in damages. On appeal, the District asserted that it had to terminate Ms. Hernandez’s employment during her probationary period because if it had not she would have become a permanent employee without having had her performance evaluated. The Fourth District agreed that the District accommodated Ms. Hernandez by giving her time off for the surgery but it was not reasonable when it included the consequence that she would lose if her job if she took leave. The appellate court rejected the District’s use of the one-year probationary period as justification for the termination. The District could have deducted the leave time from Ms. Hernandez’s probationary period so that she received a full 12-month period of time in which the District could have evaluated her performance. The Fourth District also affirmed the trial court’s finding of a violation of the good faith interactive process requirement because Ms. Hernandez was told she could not be fired for taking leave but was fired when she took the leave.

Broad employee standard established for wage order violations.

April 30, 2018, Supreme Court of California, Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Charles Lee: Two delivery drivers sued Dynamex on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly situated drivers alleging misclassification as independent contractors rather than employees, which led to a violation of a California wage order (which imposes obligations relating to the minimum wages, maximum hours, and basic working conditions such as minimally required meal and rest breaks). The issue was which standard applies, under California law, in determining whether workers should be classified as employees or as independent contractors for purposes of California wage orders: the multifactor standard set forth in S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341, or the “to suffer or permit to work” standard described in Martinez v. Combs (2010) 49 Cal.4th 35. The California Supreme Court concluded that the latter was the standard and that the suffer or permit to work definition must be interpreted broadly to treat as employees all workers who would ordinarily be viewed as working in the hiring business. In determining whether a worker is properly considered the type of independent contractor to whom the wage order does not apply, it is appropriate to look to the “ABC” test. Under this test, a worker is properly considered an independent contractor to whom a wage order does not apply only if the hiring entity establishes: (A) that the worker is free from the control and direction of the hirer in connection with the performance of the work, both under the contract for the performance of such work and in fact; (B) that the worker performs work that is outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s business; and (C) that the worker is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as the work performed for the hiring entity.

Time to file federal discrimination claims starts when the administrative agency actually provides the right-to-sue notice.

April 27, 2018, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Taylor Scott v. Gino Morena Enterprises, LLC: Ms. Scott sued her former employer alleging sexual harassment and retaliation. The trial court dismissed the case (summary judgment) after deciding that Ms. Scott’s claims were time-barred. Ms. Scott had to file a charge with a state or federal agency (or both) before filing suit. Ms. Scott filed a charge with California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) on November 13, 2013, received a right to sue from the DFEH on November 25, 2013, and filed suit on November 20, 2014 under California law. The DFEH “dual-filed” the charge with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on November 13, 2013 and the EEOC did not issue its right-to-sue notice until June 3, 2015. On June 17, 2015, the trial court allowed Ms. Scott to amend her complaint to assert federal claims. The issue was whether the 90-day period to file a case begins when Ms. Scott received the right-to-sue notice from the EEOC or 180 days after the charge was filed with the EEOC regardless of when the EEOC issued the notice. The appellate court determined that while the law governing the issue contemplates that the EEOC gives notice sometime after 180 days after the charge is filed, the 90-day period begins when the EEOC actually gives the notice.

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August and September 2017 employment law decisions

Whistle-blower claim based on University policies

September 26, 2017, Fourth District Court of Appeal, Leah Levi v. The Regents of the University of California: Dr. Levi sued the Regents for a number of claims, including a whistle-blower retaliation claim. The trial court dismissed the entire case by summary judgment. The Court of Appeal reversed with respect to the retaliation claim along with a due process claim. Regarding the retaliation claim, Dr. Levi engaged in protected activity by filing or participated in complaints regarding conflicts of interest related to other Regents’ employees, modified policies favoring another Regents employee, and retaliation for being a whistle-blower, all of which were covered by Regents policies that have the force and effect of California law.

Itemized wage statement claim for civil penalties does not require a knowing or intentional violation

September 26, 2017, First District Court of Appeal, Eduardo Lopez v. Friant & Associates, LLC: Mr. Lopez filed a case for civil penalties under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 for his employer’s failure to include the last four digits of employee Social Security numbers on itemized wage statements. The trial court dismissed the case on grounds the undisputed evidence showed the employer’s omission was not knowing or intentional. The Court of Appeal disagreed. The knowing or intentional standard is in a section (226(e)(1)) that also specifies penalties. But the penalties in section 226(e)(1) are “statutory” in nature. Mr. Lopez’s case was for “civil” penalties, which are specified in Labor Code section 2699(f). Therefore, the knowing or intentional standard did not apply in the PAGA case.

Discrimination must be based on the employee’s race

September 14, 2017, Second District Court of Appeal, George Diego v. City of Los Angeles: Mr. Diego and another police officer sued their employer for discrimination they alleged following their involvement in a fatal shooting. The case went to trial and a jury awarded the officers nearly $4 million. The City of Los Angeles appealed. The appellate court reversed the jury verdict. The officer’s legal theory was that they were treated less favorably because of their race (Latino) and the race of the victim (African-American). They relied on evidence of another shooting incident involving a white officer and Latino victim. They argued to the jury that any decision based on race by the City could demonstrate unlawful employment discrimination, and there were no jury instructions regarding consideration of the victim’s race. But a discrimination claim requires a showing that the employer’s challenged decision was substantially motivated by the employee’s race. The appellate court found that the officers did not have evidence to show that they were treated less favorably because of their race (as opposed to the race of the victim).

Marital status discrimination does not include marriage to a particular person

September 5, 2017, First District Court of Appeal, Orlando Nakai v. Friendship House Association of American Indians, Inc.: Mr. Nakai was terminated by Friendship House’s CEO, who also happened to be his mother-in-law, after his wife informed the CEO that Mr. Nakai had a gun and was angry at Friendship House employees and she had obtained a restraining order. Mr. Nakai filed a case for marital status discrimination and failure to conduct a reasonable investigation prior to termination. The trial court dismissed the case on grounds Mr. Nakai had insufficient evidence for a jury trial (summary judgment). The Court of Appeal agreed. Mr. Nakai’s theory was that he was terminated because he was the spouse of the employee who reported him and the son-in-law of the CEO. While marital status discrimination prohibits decisions based on an employee’s status as unwed or single or the granting of employment benefits to married employees only, it cannot be based on the status of being married to a particular person. Mr. Nakai’s case was based on the latter. As for the failure to investigate claim, Mr. Nakai was an at-will employee. As such, he had no right to a pre-termination investigation.

Statute of limitations to file with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing

August 29, 2017, Second District Court of Appeal, Guillermo Aviles-Rodriguez v. Los Angeles Community College District: The California Supreme Court previously decided (Romano v. Rockwell International, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 479) that an employee alleging that a discriminatory act led to the termination of his or her employment has until one year from the termination date to file an administrative claim. That case involved an at-will employee with advanced notice of the effective termination date. In this case, the employee was a professor who was denied tenure, filed a grievance regarding the denial, and then was terminated based on the denial of tenure. The Court of Appeal concluded that the rule established in Romano also applied in this case, i.e., the one-year statute of limitations began on the date of the termination, not the notice of denial of tenure.

Posted by deanroyerlaw in Employment