Anti-SLAPP

August and September 2019 employment law decisions

Retaliation claim can be proved with evidence concerning a comparator who need only be similarly situated to the plaintiff employee in all relevant respects.

September 26, 2019, First District Court of Appeal, Rashmi Gupta v. Trustees of the California State University: The court of appeal affirmed a jury verdict finding San Francisco State University retaliated against Dr. Gupta in denying her tenure and terminating her employment. The trial court did not err by allowing Dr. Gupta to present evidence of a comparator professor because the other professor was similarly situated in all relevant respects and Dr. Gupta did not have to show that she was clearly superior to him.

Premium wages required for on-duty meal periods unless there is written agreement to such meal periods.

September 26, 2019, Second District Court of Appeal, Gustavo Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc.: The court of appeal determined that at-will, on-call, hourly, nonexempt employees who are paid for on-duty meal periods are also entitled to premium wages (one hour of wages for each off-duty meal period not provided) if the employer does not have a written agreement that includes an on-duty meal period revocation clause.

Employees entitled to penalties and attorney’s fees in whistleblower retaliation case.

September 25, 2019, Second District Court of Appeal, Todd Hawkins v. City of Los Angeles: A jury found in favor of Mr. Hawkins and his co-plaintiff Hyung Kim who claimed retaliation for whistleblowing. The court of appeal affirmed the jury verdict and the trial court’s award of a Private Attorney General Act (PAGA) penalty because the plaintiffs’ pre-lawsuit notice referred to their employer’s conduct directed toward them and other employees that also impacted the public. The court of appeal also affirmed the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees under PAGA, and under a law concerning enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest (Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5) because the case concerned claims that the plaintiffs were retaliated against for reporting pressure on hearing examiners to change decisions concerning parking citations.

Common law failure to hire claim is not available.

September 24, 2019, Third District Court of Appeal, Wilfert Williams v. Sacramento River Cats Baseball Club, LLC: The court of appeal determined that Mr. Williams’s failure to hire claim is not cognizable under a common law doctrine (Tameny claim) because the doctrine requires the prior existence of an employment relationship that gives rise to an employer’s duty to not violate fundamental public policy with respect to its employees.

Employee’s whistleblower case survives anti-SLAPP motion.

August 29, 2019, Second District Court of Appeal, James Jeffra v. California State Lottery: The court of appeal disagreed with the trial court’s denial of an anti-SLAPP motion on grounds Mr. Jeffra’s whistleblower case arises from non-protected retaliation. The Second District applied a recent California Supreme Court decision that whether a case arises from protected activity depends on the elements of the claim that need to be proven. In this retaliation case, Mr. Jeffra had to prove he was subjected to an adverse employment action, which he claimed was an investigation of alleged wrongdoing (followed by administrative leave and forced retirement). Nevertheless, the court of appeal affirmed the denial of the motion because Mr. Jeffra presented sufficient evidence to establish a probability of prevailing on the merits.

Whether morbid obesity is a disability under federal law in the absence of an underlying physiological condition is an open question.

August 20, 2019, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Jose Valtierra v. Medtronic Inc.: After acknowledging that four other circuits have concluded that morbid obesity is not a disability unless caused by an underlying physiological condition, the Ninth Circuit did not take a stand on that issue. Instead it affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Mr. Valtierra’s federal disability discrimination case on grounds he did not have evidence to suggest a causal connection between his obesity and his termination.

The causation standard for federal disability discrimination claims is “but for.”

August 20, 2019, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Michael J. Murray, M.D. v. Mayo Clinic: In light of two recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s jury instruction for Mr. Murray’s federal disability discrimination claim that used a but for causation standard as opposed to a motivating factor standard.

Unfair Competition Law claims seeking private injunctive relief are subject to arbitration agreements.

August 14, 2019, Fourth District Court of Appeal, Daniel Clifford v. Quest Software Inc.: Mr. Clifford brought various wage and hour claims against his employer. Quest Software moved to compel arbitration. The trial court ordered the case to arbitration except Mr. Clifford’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) claim. The court of appeal reversed after finding that a California Supreme Court decision did not bar arbitration of a UCL claim for private (as opposed to public) injunctive relief.

The change in law for awards of attorney’s fees and costs to employers in Fair Employment and Housing Act cases applies retroactively.

August 1, 2019, Fourth District Court of Appeal, Arthur Scott v. City of San Diego: Mr. Scott rejected a $7,000 settlement offer under Code of Civil Procedure section 998. After the case went to trial and a jury found in favor of San Diego, the trial court awarded the city $51,946.96 in costs even though it found that the plaintiff’s case was not frivolous. While the appeal was pending, the California Legislature amended the governing costs statute to provide that a prevailing defendant may not recover attorney’s fees and costs, notwithstanding a section 998 offer, against a plaintiff with non-frivolous claims. The court of appeal decided that this amendment clarified existing law, meaning that the change in law applies retroactively. On this basis, it reversed the trial court’s award of costs.

Posted by deanroyerlaw in Employment

July 2019 employment law decisions

On-duty meal periods subject to the 30-minute minimum requirement.

July 31, 2019, First District Court of Appeal, L’Chaim House, Inc. v. Division of Labor Standards Enforcement: Residential care home is required to provide meal periods of at least 30 minutes even when they are “on-duty” periods, i.e., the nature of the work prevents the employees from being relieved of all duty and the employer and employees agree in writing to an on-the-job paid meal period.

Anti-SLAPP motions available in discrimination or retaliation cases but not in this particular case.

July 22, 2019, Supreme Court of California, Stanley Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc.: The anti-SLAPP statute (special motion to strike claims that arise from the defendant’s constitutionally protected activity) may be used to screen claims alleging discriminatory or retaliatory employment actions because the defendant’s adverse action is a necessary element of such claims. Mr. Wilson’s claim that his employer defamed him by privately discussing the alleged reasons for his termination with potential employers and others is not subject to the anti-SLAPP statute because the communications were not made in connection with any issue of public significance.

Employees have sufficient evidence for discrimination and harassment claims.

July 17, 2019, Third District Court of Appeal, Nancy Ortiz v. Dameron Hospital Association and Shirley Galvan v. Dameron Hospital Association: The facts were disputed whether Dameron constructively terminated Ms. Ortiz and Ms. Galvan because there was evidence that their supervisor intentionally created working conditions that would cause a reasonable person to feel compelled to resign. The facts were also disputed whether the supervisor acted with national origin discrimination motive based on evidence that the supervisor focused her criticisms on subordinates’ accents and English language skills. The facts were further disputed whether Ms. Ortiz and Ms. Galvan were subjected to unlawful harassment given the evidence of the supervisor’s criticisms of accents and English-speaking skills and references to subordinates’ ages, including calling them “too old”; and in Ms. Ortiz’s case, the additional evidence of being transferred to a unit where she had little or no experience and provided with no training, being falsely accused of sleeping on the job, and being told she would likely be fired.

Jury verdict in favor of employee in race discrimination and retaliation case affirmed.

July 17, 2019, Third District Court of Appeal, Wendell Brown v. City of Sacramento: Mr. Brown could recover for a suspension that occurred more than one year before he filed a complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) because the suspension did not become final until a union grievance challenging it was dismissed within the one-year statute of limitations period. Mr. Brown could also recover for a transfer that had been announced but not scheduled to take effect until after he filed his DFEH complaint. Although the DFEH complaint did not refer to the specific transfer, it included general language about being forced to transfer and the DFEH investigation would have likely uncovered the specific transfer at issue.

Employer not required to reimburse its employees for purchasing slip-resistance shoes.

July 8, 2019, Third District Court of Appeal, Krista Townley v. BJ’s Restaurants, Inc.: BJ’s Restaurants has a safety policy that requires its employees to wear slip-resistance shoes, although no specific brand, style, or design is required and the policy does not prohibit the employees from wearing their shoes outside of work. The California law requiring employers to reimburse their employees for expenses incurred in the discharge of their work duties (Labor Code section 2802) does not apply because the shoes are non-uniform work clothing and generally usable in the restaurant occupation.

Posted by deanroyerlaw in Employment

February 2019 employment law decisions

Professor cannot pursue defamation claim against his employer but his retaliation claim survives.

February 28, 2019, Sixth District Court of Appeal, Jason Laker v. Board of Trustees of the California State University: under the anti-SLAPP law, a professor’s defamation claim against his public university employer is based on protected activity (statements made in the course of an internal investigation of another professor), but his retaliation claim to the extent it is based on investigations into the professor’s conduct is not.

Plaintiffs in representative action cannot take the full 25 percent of civil penalties.

February 27, 2019, Second District Court of Appeal, David Moorer v. Noble L.A. Events, Inc.: the 25 percent of the civil penalties for a representative action (Private Attorney General Act of 2004) that are allocated to the “aggrieved” employees must be distributed in a pro rata amount to all of those employees.

Compensation of employees determined by California’s minimum wage rather than Long Beach as a charter city.

February 25, 2019, Second District Court of Appeal, Wendy Marquez v. City of Long Beach: Long Beach must comply with California’s minimum wage requirements notwithstanding its status as a charter city.

Representative action not subject to arbitration agreement.

February 25, 2019, Fourth District Court of Appeal, Mark Correia v. NB Baker Electric, Inc.: the California Supreme Court decision that representative actions (Private Attorney General Act of 2004) cannot be forced into arbitration is still good law.

Labor contractor who obtained temporary workers for grower company may be held liable under federal employment discrimination law.

February 6, 2019, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Global Horizons, Inc.: applying the common-law agency test, which has the extent of control over the detail of work as the principal guidepost, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision that the contractor and growers were joint employers for all purposes.

Sales clerks entitled to pay for on-call reporting time.

February 4, 2019, Second District Court of Appeal, Skylar Ward v. Tilly’s, Inc.: on-call employees in the mercantile industry who contacted their employer two hours before on-call shifts are reporting for work and are owed reporting time pay.

Employment discrimination case by drummer for Eddie Money arises from Mr. Money’s right of free speech as to which musicians performed with him.

February 1, 2019, Second District Court of Appeal, Glenn Symmonds v. Edward Joseph Mahoney: the Second District decided that the anti-SLAPP law applies to a musician’s claims concerning his termination.

Posted by deanroyerlaw in Employment

July and August 2017 employment law decisions

Disability discrimination

August 25, 2017, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Antonio Alamillo v. BNSF Railway Company: Mr. Alamillo sued BNSF Railway Company for disability discrimination and failure to provide a reasonable accommodation. The Ninth Circuit decided that Mr. Alamillo could not establish a “prima facie” case of discrimination because BNSF did not know that Mr. Alamillo was disabled when the decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings was made, and Mr. Alamillo conceded that BNSF disregarded his disability when it decided to terminate him. The appellate court also concluded that there was no reasonable accommodation claim because BNSF provided Mr. Alamillo with a “constant work schedule” and precluding BNSF from terminating Mr. Alamillo for prior misconduct is not a reasonable accommodation.

Age discrimination

August 16, 2017, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Charles Merrick v. Hilton Worldwide, Inc.: Mr. Merrick sued Hilton Worldwide, Inc. for age discrimination. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that Mr. Merrick had a “prima facie” case of discrimination because he was sixty years old when he was permanently laid off, his termination was not based on his performance, and his duties were outsourced or assumed by other employees. The appellate court also determined that Hilton had non-discriminatory explanations for the layoff. Mr. Merrick did not dispute the explanations, but claimed he could prove discrimination because Hilton did not offer to transfer him, mischaracterized his responsibilities and performance, and failed to comply with its layoff policy. The Ninth Circuit found that a position Mr. Merrick pointed to was not available and Hilton provided a list of open positions, the record did not support the mischaracterization claim, and the deviation from the layoff guidelines did not constitute specific and substantial evidence of a discriminatory motive.

Hours worked question

August 16, 2017, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Amanda Frlekin v. Apple, Inc.: The Ninth Circuit certified the following question to California Supreme Court: Is time spent on the employer’s premises waiting for, and undergoing, required exit searches of packages or bags voluntarily brought to work purely for personal convenience by employees compensable as “hours worked” within the meaning of California Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order No. 7?

Anti-SLAPP motion and discrimination

August 16, 2017, Second District Court of Appeal, Dioka Okorie v. Los Angeles Unified School District: Mr. Okorie sued the Los Angeles Unified School District alleging, among other things, discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. In response, the District filed a special motion to strike the complaint (“anti-SLAPP motion”), which the trial court granted. The court of appeal affirmed. The Second District determined that Mr. Okorie’s case was distinguishable from the recent Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057 decision, which decided that a discrimination claim may be struck only if the speech or petitioning activity itself is the wrong complained of, and not just evidence of liability. The wrong in Park was the university’s decision to deny the plaintiff tenure, but Mr. Okorie complained of a wide array of adverse employment actions, with the bulk of them being statements or communicative conduct made by District personnel. Furthermore, Mr. Okorie did not allege that the primary source of the alleged discrimination was his reassignment from his classroom to his home or his subsequent reassignment from his home to ESC, the so-called teacher’s jail. Instead, the gravamen of Mr. Okorie’s theory is discrimination via humiliation, which is meaningless outside the context of the protected speech to which anti-SLAPP protection applies.

Costs of suit

August 15, 2017, Fourth District Court of Appeal, Aleksei Sviridov v. City of San Diego: Mr. Sviridov sued the City of San Diego over his terminations. After three appeals, San Diego was awarded over $90,000 in costs. Mr. Sviridov challenged the award based on the rule that an employer may not recover its costs of suit in a Fair Employment and Housing Act or Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act case unless the court determines it to be frivolous. The court of appeal disagreed because San Diego had made three settlement offers under Code of Civil Procedure section 998, which Mr. Sviridov rejected. The Fourth District reasoned that a blanket application of the FEHA or POBRA costs rule where there is a section 998 offer would erode the public policy of encouraging settlement in such cases.

Retaliation and disability discrimination

August 8, 2017, Fourth District Court of Appeal, Melony Light v. California Department of Parks and Recreation: Ms. Light sued the California Department of Parks and Recreation for retaliation and disability discrimination. The trial court dismissed the retaliation claim on grounds there was no adverse employment action. The Fourth District reversed on grounds there was evidence that would support a finding of an adverse action: Ms. Light was moved to a different office, was subjected to verbal and physical attack during a confrontation, was told she would no longer work at the Department when her out-of-class assignment was over, had a training offer for a position rescinded, was later rejected for promotion to that position, and had her scheduled hours reduced to zero. The appellate court also determined there was direct evidence of retaliatory intent based on a supervisor’s statements that if Ms. Light did not follow orders she would be moved to a different workplace and her work at the District would end. As for the disability claim, the Fourth District affirmed the dismissal because there was no evidence the Department knew of Ms. Light’s disabilities before it took adverse action, only vague references to workplace stress.

One day’s rest in seven

August 3, 2017, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Christopher Mendoza v. Nordstrom, Inc.: Mr. Mendoza on behalf of himself and other Nordstrom employees sued Nordstrom under the California law that requires one day’s rest from work in seven. (Labor Code sections 551 and 552.) An exception applies when the employee works less than six hours. The trial court ruled in favor of Nordstrom on grounds that although Mr. Mendoza worked seven consecutive days over two work weeks on three separate occasions, he worked less than six hours on some, but not all, of those days. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision, but for different reasons. The California Supreme Court had decided that the seven-day period is only for each workweek and the exception only applies when the employee works less than six hours on all seven days. It was undisputed that Mr. Mendoza did not work seven consecutive days within any one work week.

Civil penalty versus unpaid wages

August 2, 2017, Fifth District Court of Appeal, Richard Esparza v. KS Industries, L.P.: KS Industries, L.P. sought to compel arbitration of Mr. Esparza’s claims, on behalf of himself and other employees, for civil penalties and wages arising from minimum wage and overtime violations, meal and rest break violations, timely payment of wages, failure to provide pay statements, and failure to reimburse business expenses. Mr. Esparza relied on Labor Code sections 558 and 1197.1 to contend that recovery of the unpaid wages was a form of civil penalty, which could not be forced into arbitration. The Fifth Circuit disagreed, pointing out that section 558 provides that the employee recovers 100 percent of the underpaid wages, whereas a civil penalty action (Labor Code Private Attorney’s General Act) requires 75 percent of the recovery to go to the State of California.

Hostile work environment

July 31, 2017, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Cynthia Fuller v. Idaho Department of Corrections: Ms. Fuller sued the Idaho Department of Corrections for its response to a co-worker raping her on three occasions outside of the workplace. The Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court’s dismissal of her case. The appellate court determined that a reasonable jury could conclude that the IDOC effectively condoned the rapes by requiring Ms. Fuller to return to a workplace run by supervisors who showed public support for her rapist, eagerly anticipated his return, and continued to pay him while denying her paid leave. As a result, IDOC created a hostile work environment by making it more difficult for Ms. Fuller to do her job, to take pride in her work, and to desire to stay in her position.

Vacation pay at time of separation

July 28, 2017, Fourth District Court of Appeal, Nathan Minnick v. Automotive Creations, Inc.: Mr. Minnick sued Automotive Creations, Inc. on behalf of himself and other employees alleging that their employer’s policy violated California law because it required employees who worked for less than one year to forfeit vested vacation pay. The appellate court noted that the California Supreme Court interpreted Labor Code section 227.3 to mean that once vested, vacation pay may not be forfeited. The Fourth District agreed with a Second District decision (Owen v. Macy’s, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 462), which provides that the employer may establish a waiting period before the employee becomes eligible to earn vacation, and if the employer’s policy is clearly stated, the waiting period policy is enforceable. The Fourth District affirmed the dismissal of the case.

Anti-SLAPP motion and retaliation

July 26, 2017, Fourth District Court of Appeal, Aram Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System: Mr. Bonni sued St. Joseph Health System for whistle-blower retaliation. St. Joseph filed a special motion to strike the complaint (“anti-SLAPP motion”), which the trial court granted. The court of appeal reversed. The Fourth District reviewed the recent Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057 decision, which counseled that in ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion, courts should consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for liability. The Fourth District determined that Mr. Bonni’s claim, based on Labor Code 1278.5, arises from St. Joseph’s retaliatory purpose or motive, and not from how that purpose is carried out, even if by speech or petitioning activity. It then observed that Mr. Bonni’s complaint did not allege any specific written or oral statement or writing which allegedly formed the basis of his retaliation claim. Instead, he alleged that an abusive peer review process was initiated by the hospitals because he made complaints about unsafe conditions at the hospitals. Consequently, his claim was not based merely on St. Joseph’s peer review process, or on statements made during those proceedings, but on the retaliatory purpose or motive by which it was undertaken.

Posted by deanroyerlaw in Employment

Employer defense undermined

Employer defense to employment claims undermined.

On July 29, 2016, the Third District Court of Appeal issued a strongly worded decision denying an employer’s early dismissal of an employee’s case. In Nam v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. (July 29, 2016, No. C074796) 2016 Cal. App. LEXIS 629, the issue was whether the employee’s case, as described in her initial filing (complaint), was based on the employer’s conduct protected by the federal or California constitutions.

In this case, Ms. Nam was a resident in the anesthesiology department at UC Davis Medical Center. She filed a complaint for retaliation, discrimination, sexual harassment, and wrongful termination. Ms. Nam alleged that she was sexually harassed and then retaliated against by her harasser, and also retaliated against because she complained about the clinical behavior of another doctor and serious patient care and safety issues. The Regents filed a special motion to strike (Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16), alleging that Ms. Nam’s complaint constituted a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP). In particular, the Regents contended that Ms. Nam’s complaint arose from written complaints made in connection with an investigation of and corrective action taken against Ms. Nam. The trial court denied the motion.

On appeal, the Nam court reviewed the “anti-SLAPP” law, which provides: “A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” The appellate court noted that the Legislature recognized that the law had as much potential for abuse as the litigation it was designed to thwart. The Nam court stated that “[t]his case illustrates the potential danger of abusing the anti-SLAPP law.”

The appellate court reviewed the standard for deciding whether a claim (cause of action) arises from protected activity: whether plaintiff’s cause of action itself was based on an act in furtherance of the defendant’s right of petition or free speech. The Regents asserted that Ms. Nam’s complaint was based on complaints it received about her performance, warnings it provided her, the results of ensuing investigations, and her written notice of termination. The Regents relied on the definition of protected conduct, which includes: “(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, [or] (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law….”

The court of appeal rejected this assertion. “By stitching together a number of disparate legal principles extracted from cases with very different facts, ignoring the fundamental question whether the lawsuit is indeed a SLAPP, and divorcing the analysis from the purpose of the anti-SLAPP law, defendant constructs an argument that, in effect, would subject most harassment and retaliation claims against public entities to an anti-SLAPP motion to strike.”

The Nam court acknowledged that prior decisions have established that the entire disciplinary process and grievance procedures constitute official proceedings authorized by law. The appellate court then reviewed two prior decisions, one by the Fourth District (Tuszynska v. Cunningham (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 257) and the other by the Second District (Hunter v. CBS Broadcasting Inc. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1510), in which appellate courts concluded that the employer’s motive to discriminate was irrelevant in determining whether its conduct arose from protected activity. The Nam court criticized these decisions for relying on a California Supreme Court decision (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82) that did not involve harassment, discrimination, or retaliation, and did not address the defendant’s subjective intent. In fact, the Navellier court determined that the plaintiff’s, not the defendant’s, intent was irrelevant. Accordingly, the Nam court found that it could not ignore the defendant’s alleged motive in a harassment, discrimination, or retaliation case:

“To conclude otherwise would subject most, if not all, harassment, discrimination, and retaliation cases to motions to strike. Any employer who initiates an investigation of an employee, whether for lawful or unlawful motives, would be at liberty to claim that its conduct was protected and thereby shift the burden of proof to the employee, who, without the benefit of discovery and with the threat of attorney fees looming, would be obligated to demonstrate the likelihood of prevailing on the merits. Such a result is at odds with the purpose of the anti-SLAPP law, which was designed to ferret out meritless lawsuits intended to quell the free exercise of First Amendment rights, not to burden victims of discrimination and retaliation with an earlier and heavier burden of proof than other civil litigants and dissuade the exercise of their right to petition for fear of an onerous attorney fee award.”

The Nam court then reviewed Ms. Nam’s complaint and found that it made clear that the basis of her claim was the Regents’ retaliation. On this basis, it affirmed the trial court’s denial of the Regents’ motion.

The court of appeal concluded its opinion with a powerful admonition to employers considering filing anti-SLAPP motions in employment cases. “Moreover, we question whether plaintiff’s lawsuit for harassment and retaliation should be characterized as a SLAPP. The quintessential SLAPP is filed by an economic powerhouse to dissuade its opponent from exercising its constitutional right to free speech or to petition. The objective of the litigation is not to prevail but to exact enough financial pain to induce forbearance. As its name suggests, it is a strategic lawsuit designed to stifle dissent or public participation. It is hard to imagine that a resident’s complaint alleging retaliatory conduct was designed to, or could, stifle the University from investigating and disciplining doctors who endanger public health and safety. The underlying lawsuit may or may not have merit that can be tested by summary judgment, but it is quite a stretch to consider it a SLAPP merely because a public university commences an investigation.”

Posted by deanroyerlaw in Employment